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I. INTRODUCTION
Few areas of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence have attracted as much
attention in recent decades as the case law recognizing a constitutional right to
terminate a pregnancy. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy has exercised more
influence over the Court’s abortion jurisprudence than perhaps any other sitting
Justice. His jointly authored plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of
1
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey reaffirmed the basic right to an abortion

* Justice Thomas O. Marshall Chair of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia School of Law. While
I had the chance to clerk for Justice Kennedy during the October 1990 Term, an opportunity for which I remain
very grateful, the ideas expressed in this Article are based on Justice Kennedy’s published opinions. I have not
spoken with Justice Kennedy about these issues and do not possess any nonpublic information on his views. I
would like to thank Ash Bhagwat, Clarke Forsythe, Judson Shelnutt, and John Thorp for commenting on
portions of the Article. I also appreciate feedback and editing suggestions from the editors of the McGeorge
Law Review and other participants in the symposium on “The Evolution of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s
Jurisprudence.”
1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ., plurality).
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2

first recognized in Roe v. Wade, applying that right to regulations effective from
3
the outset of pregnancy. Subsequent opinions, particularly Justice Kennedy’s
4
5
dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart and his majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart,
have instead focused on regulations applicable to abortions performed in the
6
second or third trimesters of pregnancy.
Justice Kennedy’s more recent opinions may suggest that we have not heard
the last word on state regulation of late-term abortions. The reasoning of Justice
Kennedy’s opinions in Stenberg and Gonzales casts doubt on the justification for
the dicta in Roe and Casey indicating that the constitutional right to abortion
continues until a fetus is “viable” (that is, able to survive outside the womb with
7
medical assistance). The Court has never offered an adequate constitutional
8
justification for the viability rule, a line that produces arbitrary and irrational
results, pushes U.S. law outside the international mainstream, and prevents the
development of a stable political consensus on abortion regulation. It remains to
be seen what Justice Kennedy will do if a future case requires the Court to
9
squarely address the duration of abortion rights. While his opinions in Stenberg
and Gonzales are written in such a way that the Court could continue adherence
to the viability rule, they also make clear that Justice Kennedy finds secondtrimester abortions troubling and recognizes legitimate grounds for state
10
regulation at that stage of pregnancy.
Justice Kennedy’s opinions leave open at least two paths by which the Court
might afford states greater flexibility in regulating second-trimester abortions.
First, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales (especially when read in light of his
Stenberg dissent) permits states to justify abortion regulations based on novel
state interests distinct from the two recognized in Roe (protecting fetal life and
11
maternal health). There is no reason that the viability rule, developed in the
2. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
3. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
4. 530 U.S. 914, 956–79 (2000) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
5. 550 U.S. 124, 130–68 (2007).
6. Id. at 133–40; Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 924–28.
7. See infra notes 181–86 (discussing the future of the viability rule in light of Stenberg and Gonzales).
8. See Hamilton v. Scott, No. 1100192, slip op. at 21–47 (Ala. May 18, 2012) (Parker, J., concurring)
(questioning rationale for Roe’s viability rule while explaining its inapplicability in wrongful death case). While
the Roe court first announced the viability rule as dictum, the Court has since applied it in other cases. See, e.g.,
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979). Nevertheless, the duration of abortion rights has never been “squarely
addressed” on the basis of plenary briefing and argument. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631
(1993) (stare decisis did not bar reconsideration of rule applied in prior cases where issue never “squarely
addressed”). As a result, the Court has never adequately explained its rationale for the viability rule.
9. Throughout this Article, the phrase “duration of abortion rights” refers to the courts’ determination of
the stage in pregnancy at which the Constitution permits governmental regulations that create a substantial
obstacle to abortion.
10. See infra Parts III.C–D.
11. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–58; see also Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 956–79; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
163 (1973).
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context of the particular state interest in protecting potential life, would
12
necessarily govern all of the new state interests Gonzales permits.
Second, it may be time to revisit the viability rule or, more accurately, to
finally consider its validity for the first time on the basis of plenary briefing and
13
argument. The Court adopted the viability rule in dicta in Roe and reaffirmed it
14
in dicta in Casey. Consequently, the Court has not grappled with the duration of
15
abortion rights in a case where the answer mattered to the outcome. The result
has been the Court’s longstanding failure to explain why the capacity to survive
outside the womb should be required as a constitutional matter before a state can
protect the life of a second-trimester fetus. These factors—adoption in dicta,
inadequacy of briefing and argument, and failure to offer a convincing
rationale—have long been viewed as undercutting the precedential weight of
16
rules announced in prior opinions.
Moreover, the pragmatic considerations that persuaded the Casey plurality to
17
retain the right to an abortion weigh in favor of reconsidering the viability rule.
For instance, the Court has acknowledged “the uncertainty of the viability
18
determination,” a characteristic that makes viability unworkable as a line to
regulate medical practice. Likewise, while some women may rely on the
availability of abortion in making decisions about relationships and career paths,
it is implausible that many substantially rely on the viability rule’s extension of
abortion rights through most of the second trimester of pregnancy. Consequently,
the Court’s stare decisis opinions would support reconsideration of the duration
19
of abortion rights in a case that squarely presented the issue.
Part II of this Article considers the Court’s adoption of the viability rule in
Roe and highlights various problems the rule creates. Part III surveys Justice
Kennedy’s positions in several cases, with a particular focus on the implications
of his opinions for regulating late-term abortions and the continuing force of the
viability rule.

12. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–58; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64.
14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter,
JJ., plurality).
15. See Randy Beck, Transtemporal Separation of Powers in the Law of Precedent, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1405, 1460–63 (2012) [hereinafter Beck, Transtemporal Separation of Powers].
16. See id. at 1460–64.
17. See infra notes 197–223 and accompanying text.
18. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979).
19. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993).

33

02_BECK_VER_01_5-21-12_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 2:32 PM

2013 / State Interests and the Duration of Abortion Rights
II. THE VIABILITY RULE OF ROE V. WADE
In determining the precedential effect of judicial opinions, we distinguish
holding and dictum because we expect judges to do a better job of resolving a
dispute currently before the court than in anticipating future cases with unknown
20
litigants and unforeseen facts. The record of a case informs judges about the
21
pending litigation, but may have little relevance for future cases. The parties’
briefs focus the court on issues raised in the ongoing dispute, but may provide no
22
assistance on issues likely to arise in subsequent cases. In recent articles,
therefore, I have argued that the Justices of the Supreme Court took a significant
misstep when they decided to include extensive dicta in Roe v. Wade focusing on
23
the duration of abortion rights, an issue the parties neither briefed nor argued.
The Texas statute in Roe and the Georgia statute at issue in the companion case
24
of Doe v. Bolton regulated abortions in the early stages of pregnancy. Neither
case forced the Justices to confront the distinct issues and the grim realities that
25
arise when clinicians perform abortions later in the process of gestation. The
Roe Court’s decision to draw durational lines was therefore premature and poorly
26
executed.
The first drafts of Roe and Doe made no attempt to address the duration of
27
abortion rights. Following the initial argument to a seven-Justice Court, Justice
Blackmun circulated an opinion in Roe that would have invalidated the Texas
statute on vagueness grounds and an opinion in Doe that would have struck down

20. See Beck, Transtemporal Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1418; Pierre N. Leval, Judging
Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1261–63 (2006) (criticizing judicial
lawmaking through dicta).
21. See Baker v. Welch, No. 03CIV.2267(JSR)(AJP), 2003 WL 22901051 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2003)
(“The Court reiterates that this is dicta and is based on the limited record before the Court (and defense
counsel’s failure to address this issue); other cases with a better developed record may lead to a different
result.”); Randy Beck, Fueling Controversy, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 735, 743 (2012) [hereinafter Beck, Fueling
Controversy] (explaining that since Roe did not require opinion on duration of abortion rights, record not
prepared to address factual questions relevant to that issue).
22. Leval, supra note 20, at 1261–62.
23. Beck, Transtemporal Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1458–64; Beck, Fueling Controversy,
supra note 21, at 738–44; Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origin of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester
Framework, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 505, 515 (2011) [hereinafter Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta]; Randy Beck,
Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249 (2009); Randy Beck, The Essential Holding of
Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75 UMKC L. REV. 713 (2007) [hereinafter Beck, Essential Holding].
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); Doe, 410 U.S. 179, 183–84 (1973).
25. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; Doe, 410 U.S. at 183–84.
26. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63.
27. Roe v. Wade, 1st Draft (May 18, 1972), in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Box 151, Folder 4 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Doe v. Bolton, 1st Draft
(May 25, 1972), in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 152, Folder 7
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta, supra note 23, at 517–18
(discussing the first drafts of Roe and Doe opinions).
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28

much of the Georgia statute based on an abortion right of unspecified duration.
However, believing the cases warranted a full complement of nine Justices,
Justice Blackmun recommended re-argument the following term with Justices
29
Powell and Rehnquist on the bench. In his memorandum advocating a second
round of oral arguments, Justice Blackmun raised a number of questions about
how the cases should be approached, including the possibility of employing dicta
so the opinions could cover more ground: “Should we spell out—although it
would then necessarily be largely dictum—just what aspects are controllable by
30
the State and to what extent?”
31
The second draft of Roe began the process of “spell[ing] out” the
ramifications of a right to abortion for cases not before the Court, concluding that
states would have a compelling interest in regulating abortion after the first
32
trimester of pregnancy. Justice Blackmun’s memorandum accompanying this
draft acknowledged that the revised opinion addressed unnecessary issues:
In its present form it contains dictum, but I suspect that in this area some
dictum is indicated and not to be avoided.
You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the first
trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other selected
33
point, such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary.
Justice Stewart likewise noted the inclusion of dictum in this second draft of Roe,
specifically its treatment of the duration of abortion rights:
One of my concerns with your opinion as presently written is the
specificity of its dictum—particularly in its fixing of the end of the first
trimester as the critical point for valid state action. I appreciate the
inevitability and indeed wisdom of dicta in the Court’s opinion, but I
wonder about the desirability of the dicta being quite so inflexibly
34
“legislative.”

28. Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta, supra note 23, at 517–18.
29. Id. at 518.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 520.
33. Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Conference Re: No. 70-18–Roe v. Wade
(Nov. 21, 1972), in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 151, Folder 6
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
34. Memorandum from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice Harry A. Blackmun Re: Abortion Cases (Dec.
14, 1972), in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 151, Folder 8 (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
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Notwithstanding Justice Stewart’s concerns, Roe’s dicta arguably became even
more “legislative” in the third draft, which formed the basis for the published
35
opinion. Justice Blackmun drew two distinct durational lines tied to two
36
different state interests, erecting Roe’s famous “trimester framework.” The
Court indicated that the state interest in regulating medical aspects of abortion to
protect the mother’s health would become a compelling interest at the end of the
37
first trimester. The state interest in protecting the “potential life” of the fetus
38
would not become compelling until the fetus became viable, usually in the third
trimester, when the fetus was “potentially able to live outside the mother’s
39
womb, albeit with artificial aid.”
Roe’s unnecessary construction of the trimester framework, including the
viability rule, departed from the policy that “[t]he Court will not ‘formulate a rule
of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to
40
41
be applied,’” a practice usually viewed as a “safe guide[] to sound judgment.”
The viability rule—included among other dicta in a case dealing with early
42
abortions —prevented state regulation of most second-trimester abortions, at
least to the extent that the regulation was premised on a state interest in
preserving unborn human life. The Court has never offered a plausible
constitutional justification for extending abortion rights to the point of fetal
43
viability and Roe makes it impossible to adopt abortion laws in line with
international norms or with majority sentiment in this country.

35. See Roe v. Wade, 3d Draft (Dec. 21, 1972), in Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Box 151, Folder 6 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Beck, SelfConscious Dicta, supra note 23, at 525.
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–63 (1973).
37. Id. at 163 (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother,
the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first
trimester.”).
38. Id. (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’
point is at viability.”).
39. Id. at 160. “Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even
at 24 weeks.” Id.
40. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Emigration Comm’rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
41. Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co., 113 U.S. at 39.
42. Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta, supra note 23, at 513–15.
43. See Laurence H. Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Rules in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1973) (“[E]ven if there is a need to divide pregnancy into several segments with lines
that clearly identify the limits of governmental power, ‘interest balancing’ of the form the Court pursues [in
Roe] fails to justify any of the lines actually drawn.”).
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A. The Viability Rule Is Arbitrary
In evaluating whether viability represents a sensible line to distinguish
fetuses amenable to state protection from those that are not, it helps to focus on
how doctors determine fetal viability. Doctors assess viability in light of
biological facts relating to the fetus and technological facts about available
44
medical facilities. In Colautti v. Franklin, the Court emphasized “the
uncertainty of the viability determination”:
As the record in this case indicates, a physician determines whether or
not a fetus is viable after considering a number of variables: the
gestational age of the fetus, derived from the reported menstrual history
of the woman; fetal weight, based on an inexact estimate of the size and
condition of the uterus; the woman’s general health and nutrition; the
quality of the available medical facilities; and other factors. Because of
the number and the imprecision of these variables, the probability of any
particular fetus’ obtaining meaningful life outside the womb can be
determined only with difficulty. Moreover, the record indicates that even
if agreement may be reached on the probability of survival, different
physicians equate viability with different probabilities of survival, and
some physicians refuse to equate viability with any numerical probability
at all. In the face of these uncertainties, it is not unlikely that experts will
disagree over whether a particular fetus in the second trimester has
45
advanced to the stage of viability.
As Colautti makes clear, rather than being a description of an existing state of
facts, the conclusion that a fetus is viable is really more of a medical prediction—
often a highly disputable prediction—concerning what might happen to a fetus if
46
you radically change its location. There is no clear distinguishing feature that
47
separates viable fetuses from previable fetuses. Different doctors might classify
the same fetus as viable or nonviable, perhaps for reasons having nothing to do
with the fetus itself, but arising instead from differences in medical skill or
48
treatment philosophy.
The viability rule purported to balance the state interest in protecting fetal
49
life against the interests of a woman in terminating a pregnancy. It identified a
44. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395–96 (1979).
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 260. Research indicates that the
medical team’s assessment of viability itself influences prospects for survival. Id. This would make sense if
viability determinations guide decision making concerning how aggressively to treat preterm infants.
49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–63 (1973).
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tipping point, at which the state interest in fetal life—an interest which, the Court
stated, “grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term”—could be
50
thought to outweigh the mother’s interests. Presumably, the Roe Court’s
identification of viability as that tipping point rested on a view that the fetus
either becomes more valuable to the state in some constitutionally relevant sense
when it might be able to survive outside the womb, or that the mother’s interest
in ending pregnancy becomes less weighty at that point. Regrettably, the Roe
51
Court did not clarify the reasoning underlying its conclusion. While the Court
alluded to “logical and biological justifications” for “State regulation protective
52
of fetal life after viability,” it nowhere explained those justifications or why
they took on added weight at the point when the fetus crossed the viability
53
threshold. Many states would take the position that the interest in protecting
unborn human life weighs just as heavily in the weeks and days before doctors
deem the fetus viable as in the days and weeks afterwards. A number of Justices
54
have therefore described viability as an arbitrary line. Indeed, even Justice
Blackmun acknowledged privately to his colleagues that drawing a line at the
55
first trimester or at viability might be “equally arbitrary.”
Viability represents an arbitrary line because factors that may influence
56
viability are “morally and constitutionally irrelevant.” Due to advances in
neonatal care, the state may be able to protect a fetus from abortion today when,
just a few years before, it would have been constitutionally disabled from

50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 163.
53. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
54. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 989 n.5 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The arbitrariness of
the viability line is confirmed by the Court’s inability to offer any justification for it beyond the conclusory
assertion that it is only at that point that the unborn child’s life ‘can in reason and all fairness’ be thought to
override the interests of the mother.”); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 795 (1986) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
The governmental interest at issue is in protecting those who will be citizens if their lives are not
ended in the womb. The substantiality of this interest is in no way dependent on the probability that
the fetus may be capable of surviving outside the womb at any given point in its development, as the
possibility of fetal survival is contingent on the state of medical practice and technology, factors that
are in essence morally and constitutionally irrelevant. The State’s interest is in the fetus as an entity
in itself, and the character of this entity does not change at the point of viability under conventional
medical wisdom.
Id.; see also, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O’Connor, J.,
joined by White, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The choice of viability as the point at which the state
interest in potential life becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than choosing any point before viability or any
point afterward.”).
55. Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta, supra note 23, at 516–18; see also supra text accompanying note 33.
56. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 (White, J., dissenting).
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57

protecting an identical fetus. A mother in an urban area with advanced neonatal
facilities may have a viable fetus that might then become nonviable at a later date
58
if the mother travels to a remote location with more primitive treatment options.
Even more troubling is evidence that viability varies based on biological factors
59
such as race and gender. African-American and female fetuses tend to reach
viability at an earlier gestational age than their Caucasian and male
60
counterparts. As a result, the right to abortion tends to last longer for Caucasian
61
women than for similarly situated African-American women.
Behavioral and environmental factors can also influence the viability
threshold. For instance, research has shown that smoking during pregnancy slows
62
fetal growth. Since fetal weight strongly influences viability, women who
smoke during pregnancy can expect the right to abortion under the viability rule
to last longer than for similarly situated women who do not. Indeed, even altitude
has a measurable impact on fetal growth and, hence, viability:
On average, every 3,300 feet of elevation gained reduces fetal weight by
about 3.5 ounces, according to a 1997 study in Colorado.
So in Summit County, with an average elevation of about 9,000 feet,
babies could on average be born about 10 ounces lighter than those born
at sea level.
The percentage of low birth weight infants increases by around 50
percent from the lowest elevations to the highest elevations in the state,
63
the study showed.

57. Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 258–59.
58. Id. at 259 (quoting STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE ETHICS OF ARTIFICIAL UTERUSES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
REPRODUCTION AND ABORTION 87 (2004)).
59. See id. at 260–61; Beck, Essential Holding, supra note 23, at 731.
60. Id.
61. Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 261.
62. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL 576 (2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/2004/
complete_report/index.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The evidence is sufficient to infer a
causal relationship between maternal active smoking and fetal growth restriction and low birth weight.”); U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE 2004 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING: WHAT IT MEANS TO YOU 18 (2004), available at http://www.thriveri.org/documents/
4g_health_consequences_smoking.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Babies of mothers who
smoked during pregnancy have lower birth weights, often weighing less than 5.5 pounds. Low birth weight
babies are at greater risk for childhood and adult illnesses and even death. Babies of smokers have less muscle
mass and more fat than babies of nonsmokers. Nicotine causes the blood vessels to constrict in the umbilical
cord and womb. This decreases the amount of oxygen to the unborn baby. This can lead to low birth weight.”).
63. Julia Conors, The Altitude Efffect [sic], SUMMIT DAILY NEWS (Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.
summitdaily.com/article/20070807/NEWS/70807025 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Gwenn
M. Jensen & Lorna G. Moore, The Effect of High Altitude and Other Risk Factors on Birthweight: Independent
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Other factors being equal, therefore, one would expect the right to abortion under
the viability rule to last longer on average for women living in the mountains of
Colorado than for similarly situated women living on the California coast.
The basic problem with the viability rule is that the Roe Court unreflectively
imported a medical line into an unrelated constitutional context. A student’s time
running the one-hundred yard dash may be significant to the track coach, but
should have no impact on grades awarded by the math teacher. Similarly, the fact
that fetal viability may be significant to doctors considering treatment options for
pregnant women does not show that it should be significant to judges
determining the constitutional status of a fetus. Doctors determining viability
make the best predictions they can about fetal survival in light of the particular
circumstances and the available data. The statistical conclusion that an AfricanAmerican or female fetus may be more likely to survive premature delivery than
64
a Caucasian or male fetus is just a fact and, in the medical context, does not
purport to say anything about the worth or significance of different fetuses. The
medical scenarios that lead doctors to focus on fetal viability have little to do
with the duration of abortion rights, where the focus is on the value a state may
attribute to the developing fetus from a moral or constitutional perspective. Given
that crossing the viability threshold does not involve any significant change in the
fetus that suddenly makes it more valuable in light of the state interest in
protecting human life, and given that the viable fetus imposes no less of a burden
on its mother than a previable fetus, it is hard to see why the Court views this
medically significant line as controlling amenability to state protection as a
matter of constitutional law.
B. The Viability Rule Is Extreme
The viability rule is not only arbitrary, but also extreme. One line of evidence
derives from comparing the viability rule with the abortion laws of other
countries. In certain contexts, Justice Kennedy has been receptive to this sort of
international comparison. For instance, in Roper v. Simmons, resolving an Eighth
Amendment issue, Justice Kennedy found that, though international practice is
not controlling, the Court’s “determination that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the
stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world that continues
65
to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.” With respect to abortion,
the United States is one of only six countries that permit abortion for any reason
or Interactive Effects?, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1003, 1003 (1997).
64. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
65. 542 U.S. 551, 575 (2005); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing decision of
European Court of Human Rights in discussing due process issues raised by state statute criminalizing
homosexual conduct).

40
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to the point of viability or beyond. Most nations require a legally permissible
67
reason for seeking an abortion. Of the minority of countries that allow abortion
for any reason, the great majority recognize the right only through the first twelve
68
weeks of pregnancy.
The second line of evidence showing that the viability rule is extreme rests
on polling data in this country. In July of 1996, a sizable majority of the public—
sixty-four percent—said they believed abortion should generally be legal in the
first three months of pregnancy, compared to thirty percent who said abortion
69
should generally be illegal during that period. However, an enormous shift in
70
opinion occurred when Gallup asked about second-trimester abortions. An even
larger majority of sixty-five percent said that abortion should be generally illegal
in the second trimester, compared to only twenty-six percent who thought it
71
should generally be legal at that stage. Fifteen years later, the percentage of the
72
public opposing second-trimester abortions had increased. A Gallup poll in June
2011 found a sixty-two to thirty-five percent split between those who thought
abortion should generally be legal in the first trimester and those who thought it
73
should generally be illegal. But, when asked about the second trimester,
seventy-one percent said abortion should generally be illegal compared to only
74
twenty-four percent who thought it should generally be legal at that stage.
As these numbers suggest, many people in the United States support legal
access to abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy, but not in the second
75
trimester. In another recent Gallup poll, over half of those who identified
themselves as “pro-choice” told pollsters that abortion should be illegal in the
76
second trimester. Nevertheless, as a result of the Supreme Court’s viability rule,
second-trimester abortions remain presumptively legal, notwithstanding
supermajority public opinion to the contrary.

66. Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 264.
67. Id. at 263–64.
68. Id. at 264.
69. See Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/Abortion.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2012)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (summarizing prior polling on abortion questions).
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Beck, Fueling Controversy, supra note 21, at 746–47.
76. Lydia Saad, Plenty of Common Ground Found in Abortion Debate, GALLUP (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/148880/plenty-common-ground-found-abortion-debate.aspx (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that fifty-two percent of self-described “pro-choice” respondents and ninety
percent of “pro-life” respondents support a policy of making “[a]bortion illegal in second trimester”).
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III. JUSTICE KENNEDY AND THE VIABILITY RULE
Justice Kennedy has joined or written a number of opinions in which Roe’s
viability rule played a role, but it is not clear whether those opinions reflect any
final, settled view on the duration of abortion rights. In Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, Justice Kennedy first joined a plurality opinion criticizing
viability as a constitutionally controlling line in the Court’s abortion
77
jurisprudence. He took a somewhat different position when he jointly authored a
plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
78
purporting to reaffirm the viability rule. However, since Casey involved
regulations applicable from the outset of pregnancy, the plurality’s discussion of
the duration of abortion rights constituted dictum, with no impact on the pending
79
litigation. The Casey plurality, while purporting to reaffirm the viability rule,
greatly diminished the significance of viability for constitutional analysis,
80
permitting previability regulations that Roe would not have allowed.
More recently, in his dissenting opinion in Stenberg v. Carhart and his
majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy voted to uphold
regulations of late-term abortions that applied both previability and
81
postviability. Justice Kennedy expressed concern with the methods used to
perform second-trimester abortions and proved willing to accept a broadened
82
array of state interests offered as justifications for the regulations in question. In
particular, he approved a state interest in distinguishing abortion from infanticide
83
that implicitly analogized the previable fetus to a newborn infant. While it is
possible Justice Kennedy may continue to adhere to the viability rule in future
litigation, his opinions highlight multiple routes by which he might recognize
84
greater state authority to regulate abortions after the first trimester.
A. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
Justice Kennedy first weighed in on Roe’s viability rule after just one year on
the Supreme Court. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a fractured
85
majority upheld several challenged provisions of a Missouri abortion statute.

77. 492 U.S. 490 (1989); see also infra Part III.A.
78. 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ., plurality).
79. See id. at 844–46, 870–74.
80. See infra Part III.B.
81. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Kennedy,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
82. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124; Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 956.
83. See infra Parts III.C–D.
84. See infra Part III.E.
85. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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Justice Kennedy and Justice White joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality
86
opinion, while Justices O’Connor and Scalia each concurred separately. The
most controversial provision of the statute concerned medical determinations of
viability; the plurality characterized the statute as creating “a presumption of
viability at 20 weeks, which the physician must rebut with tests indicating that
87
the fetus is not viable prior to performing an abortion.” The statute “also
direct[ed] the physician’s determination as to viability by specifying
88
consideration, if feasible, of gestational age, fetal weight, and lung capacity.”
However, the plurality rejected a reading of the statute that would require
performing certain tests, even if unhelpful in determining the viability of a
89
particular fetus.
The Webster plurality considered the Missouri statute inconsistent with the
90
viability rule as developed in the Supreme Court’s post-Roe case law. The
plurality thought the statute incompatible with the Court’s conclusion in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth that “‘the determination of whether
a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the
91
responsible attending physician.’” More particularly, the statute ran afoul of the
extension of Danforth’s principle in Colautti, where the Court said that “neither
the legislature nor the courts may proclaim one of the elements entering into the
ascertainment of viability—be it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other
single factor—as the determinant of when the State has a compelling interest in
92
the life or health of the fetus.”
This conflict between the Missouri statute and the Court’s earlier decisions
led the Webster plurality to critique Roe’s “rigid trimester analysis of the course
of a pregnancy” for “making constitutional law in this area a virtual Procrustean
93
bed.” The plurality noted that “[t]he key elements of the Roe framework—
trimesters and viability—are not found in the text of the Constitution or in any
94
place else one would expect to find a constitutional principle.” The opinion
pointedly challenged the central premise of the viability rule concerning the
value of developing human life:
[W]e do not see why the State’s interest in protecting potential human
life should come into existence only at the point of viability, and that

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 516–17 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976)).
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388–89 (1979).
Webster, 492 U.S. at 517.
Id. at 518.
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there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after
viability but prohibiting it before viability. The dissenters in Thornburgh,
writing in the context of the Roe trimester analysis, would have
recognized this fact by positing against the “fundamental right”
recognized in Roe the State’s “compelling interest” in protecting
potential human life throughout pregnancy. “[T]he State’s interest, if
95
compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability.”
Even though the Missouri viability determination statute increased the cost of
abortions and was irreconcilable with prior precedent applying the viability rule,
the plurality found the statute constitutional on the ground that it “permissibly
96
furthers the State’s interest in protecting potential human life . . . .”
B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justices
Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter jointly authored a plurality opinion that
97
reaffirmed the “essential holding of Roe v. Wade.” The plurality sought to retain
the basic right to abortion, in part because “people have organized intimate
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
98
contraception should fail.” With respect to the duration of abortion rights, the
plurality opined that viability should remain a constitutionally determinative
dividing line in pregnancy: “Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial
99
obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.” At the same
time, the plurality recognized that “the State has legitimate interests from the
outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the
100
fetus that may become a child.” Therefore, the opinion discarded Roe’s
101
trimester framework, and permitted previability abortion regulations designed

95. Id. at 519 (quoting Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795
(1986) (White, J., dissenting)).
96. Id. at 519–20. Justice O’Connor concurred on the ground that the Missouri statute, when properly
read, did not conflict with Roe and subsequent cases. Id. at 525 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia
argued that the plurality opinion would “effectively” overrule Roe, something he would prefer to do “more
explicitly.” Id. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. 505 U.S. 841, 846 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ., plurality).
98. Id. at 856.
99. Id. at 846.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 873.
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to protect fetal life, so long as the regulations did not create an “undue burden”
102
on abortion rights prior to viability.
In some respects, the Justices in the Casey plurality seemed to desire a
103
peacemaking role in the abortion controversy. Their opinion took account of
the interests driving the abortion conflict and allowed activists on either end of
the spectrum to walk away with a partial victory addressing some of their
concerns. The opinion gave pro-life citizens somewhat greater leeway to pursue
abortion regulation through the legislative process and recognized a legitimate
state interest in protecting fetal life from the outset of pregnancy. At the same
time, the opinion assured pro-choice citizens that the ultimate decision about
abortions early in pregnancy would be made by the pregnant woman. However, it
is difficult for judges to play a mediating role when issuing authoritative
opinions. A true mediator can discuss possible compromises with contending
parties, adjust proposals as the parties reveal more about their underlying
concerns, and then lobby the parties to voluntarily accept an arrangement
calculated to resolve the conflict. A judicial opinion, on the other hand, affords
no opportunity for contending parties to discuss a proposed resolution and
explain vital issues it overlooks. Since the Casey Court had no reason to focus on
late-term abortions, the settlement fashioned by the plurality failed to account for
some of the central concerns motivating pro-life activism, especially the unique
issues surrounding second-trimester abortions.
Casey did relieve some of the pressure that had built up around the abortion
controversy, partially remanding the issue to the legislatures where contending
parties can hash out contentious issues. However, the dicta purporting to reaffirm
the viability rule limited the potential for legislative mediation of the abortion
104
conflict. Given that approximately seventy percent of Americans believe
105
abortion should generally be illegal in the second trimester of pregnancy, a rule
that prevents legislators from placing any “substantial obstacle” in the path of a
second-trimester abortion impedes legislative attempts to work out compromises
acceptable to a majority of the public.
The Casey plurality’s decision to retain the viability rule represented dictum
106
for the same reason that creation of the viability rule was dictum in Roe. The
provisions of the Pennsylvania statute before the Court in Casey—its definition
of a “medical emergency,” the informed consent provision, the twenty-four hour

102. Id. at 874.
103. See id. at 867 (discussing the “dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution”).
104. See generally Beck, Fueling Controversy, supra note 23, at 744–49 (discussing how the viability
rule hinders political resolution of the abortion controversy).
105. See supra text accompanying note 74.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 20–43.
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waiting period, the spousal-notification provision, the parental-consent
requirement, and the recordkeeping and reporting rules—all applied to abortions
107
performed early in pregnancy. The validity of these provisions did not turn on
108
the duration of abortion rights. Therefore, the parties’ briefs focused on
whether the Court should continue to recognize a constitutional right to an
abortion rather than the distinct question of how late in pregnancy such a right
109
should endure. Nothing in the case forced the Court to confront the unique and
110
troubling issues raised by late-term abortions as distinct from early abortions.
The Casey plurality premised its reaffirmation of the viability rule (in diluted
111
form) on stare decisis considerations. The plurality acknowledged an obligation
to justify the viability rule: “[L]egislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary
without the necessity of offering a justification. But courts may not. We must
112
justify the lines we draw.” However, the plurality’s justification for the
viability rule essentially boiled down to a single sentence:
[T]he concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there
is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the
womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason
and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the
113
rights of the woman.
This suggestion that viability marks the “independent existence” of a “second
life” must be harmonized with the plurality’s conclusion that a state has a
legitimate interest in protecting “the life of the fetus that may become a child”
114
beginning from “the outset of the pregnancy.” Justice Kennedy would later
write in Gonzales, “by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus
is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not it is viable outside

107. Beck, Essential Holding, supra note 23, at 716–17.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 718.
110. See Part II.C–D (discussing the right to abortion in the context of second-trimester methods in
Stenberg and Gonzales).
111. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 841, 870 (1992).
112. Id.
113. Id. The plurality also argued that no line is “more workable” than viability. Id. I question this
assertion below, since a line based on gestational age would avoid some of the problems and ambiguities
associated with the viability rule. See infra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. In any event, even if viability
worked as well as other possible lines, that does not provide a reason for selecting viability as the controlling
point in pregnancy. See Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 273. The plurality also
argued that a woman who fails to obtain an abortion before viability could be said to have consented to state
regulation. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. But, one could make the same argument about other points in pregnancy, so
this contention does not justify selecting viability over other possible lines. See Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the
Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 273.
114. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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the womb.” Thus, one cannot understand the plurality as denying that a fetus is
a life distinct from the mother before viability.
116
The plurality’s somewhat understated justification for the viability rule
presumably means that the hypothetical “independent existence” associated with
viability somehow makes the fetus more valuable or worthy of state protection
than the same fetus immediately before it crosses the viability threshold. This
position raises a number of questions about how the plurality viewed the
117
interplay of “state power and fetal entitlement.” In an important sense, the
viable fetus is no more independent of the mother than the previable fetus; both
remain in the womb and depend on the mother’s body for survival. There is no
other difference in kind between the previable and the viable fetus, such as a
clear distinction in attributes. The only difference between the previable and the
viable fetus is a debatable and possibly inaccurate prediction, made by a fallible
and possibly self-interested doctor, about the probable consequences of removing
118
the fetus from the womb.
Though they did not have the luxury of writing on a blank slate, the Casey
plurality, like the Justices in Roe, might have done well to forego opining on the
duration of abortion rights until the Court faced a case where the answer mattered
to the outcome. Early abortions and late-term abortions involve distinct
procedures and raise different issues. In reaffirming Roe’s conclusion “that the
Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early
119
stages,” Casey could have left unaddressed the effect of that reaffirmation on
late-term abortions, which the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute
did not specifically implicate.
If the Casey Court had waited for a case involving late-term abortions, it
would have enjoyed the benefit of briefing and a factual record focused on the
duration of abortion rights. The Court could have addressed the durational
question in the context of a concrete controversy, where the consequences of
drawing a particular line would be starkly highlighted. Having been reminded of
120
Colautti’s emphasis on “the uncertainty of the viability determination,” the
Casey plurality might have been less apt to embrace viability on the theory that it
121
would provide “a line that is clear” to govern abortion rights. Having been
reminded that Roe literally did not provide any reason for adopting the viability

115. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007).
116. Casey, 505 U.S. at 989 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing
plurality’s argument as “conclusory”).
117. Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 275–76.
118. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
119. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
120. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979).
121. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
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122

rule, the plurality might have avoided describing Roe’s line-drawing effort as
123
“a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care.” If the Court had waited for a
case with plenary briefing and argument on the duration of abortion rights, it is
less likely the plurality would have written that “no line other than viability . . . is
124
more workable.” After all, a line based on a particular gestational age (for
example, twenty weeks) is simpler, less debatable, and easier to apply than
viability, which incorporates gestational age among several factors influencing a
125
disputable and semi-subjective medical prediction. In a case with plenary
briefing, where the duration of abortion rights affected the outcome of the
litigation, the Court could have carefully weighed the evidence that viability
varies with fetal race and gender, as well as behavioral and environmental factors
126
like maternal smoking and altitude.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that the Casey plurality
127
attempted to steer a careful course in a high-profile case. It is easy to sit back
with the benefit of twenty years’ hindsight and suggest what the plurality should
have done differently, but the plurality had to act quickly in the heat of intense
public scrutiny. In any event, it is worth noting that, although the plurality
purported to retain the viability rule, it did so in a much-diminished form.
Considered against the background of prior case law, Casey is a substantial
retreat from Roe with respect to the legal significance attributed to fetal viability.
Viability no longer marked the point in pregnancy at which states could regulate
to protect fetal life, but now merely represented the point at which those
128
regulations could take the form of an outright prohibition. While reaffirming
the viability rule in dicta, the Casey plurality substantially weakened the rule,
making it less significant than the version applied after Roe.
C. Stenberg v. Carhart
Stenberg v. Carhart, the first “partial-birth abortion” case to make its way to
129
the Supreme Court, shone a judicial spotlight on late-term methods of abortion.
In defending its statute, Nebraska did not challenge the Casey plurality’s
130
controlling opinion. Consequently, the case offered no opportunity for

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

48

See Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 268–70.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 45.
See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
See Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
See id. at 873 (rejecting Roe’s trimester framework).
See 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
Id. at 930–31.
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reconsideration of the viability rule. The Court grappled with the distinction
between the method of abortion Nebraska purported to forbid, the “dilation and
extraction” (D&X) method, in which the fetus is killed after partial delivery, and
the more common “dilation and evacuation” (D&E) method, in which the fetus is
132
dismembered and removed from the womb piece by piece. A 5–4 majority
struck down the Nebraska statute on two grounds: the statute (1) did not contain
an exception for a case where the doctor might view the D&X as preferable to
protect the mother’s health; and (2) could be read to forbid both D&X and D&E
133
abortions, which Nebraska conceded would amount to an undue burden on
134
abortion rights.
135
Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in Stenberg. His opinion made
136
clear that he found the methods used to perform late-term abortions troubling.
He also agreed with the majority’s acknowledgement that the descriptions of the
D&X and D&E in the majority opinion might seem “‘clinically cold or
137
callous’” :
The majority views the procedures from the perspective of the
abortionist, rather than from the perspective of a society shocked when
confronted with a new method of ending human life. Words invoked by
the majority, such as “transcervical procedures,” “[o]smotic dilators,”
“instrumental disarticulation,” and “paracervical block,” may be accurate
and are to some extent necessary; but for citizens who seek to know why
laws on this subject have been enacted across the Nation, the words are
insufficient. Repeated references to sources understandable only to a
trained physician may obscure matters for persons not trained in medical
138
terminology.
Justice Kennedy went on to describe both methods of late-term abortion at issue
139
in the case using clear, sometimes even chilling, language.
Apart from his apparent aversion to late-term methods of abortion, Justice
Kennedy’s principal difference with the majority concerned how Casey should be

131. See id.
132. Id. at 923–30.
133. Id. at 930, 939.
134. See id. at 949 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Nebraska conceded at oral argument that ‘the State
could not prohibit the D&E procedure.’”).
135. Id. at 956–79.
136. See id. at 957.
137. Id. at 957 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 923).
138. Id. at 957–58 (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 958–60.
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understood with respect to the role of state interests in evaluating abortion
140
regulations.
As [Dr. Carhart] interprets the controlling cases in this Court, the only
two interests the State may advance through regulation of abortion are in
the health of the woman who is considering the procedure and in the life
of the fetus she carries. The Court, as I read its opinion, accedes to his
views, misunderstanding Casey and the authorities it confirmed.
Casey held that cases decided in the wake of Roe v. Wade had “given
[state interests] too little acknowledgment and implementation.” The
decision turned aside any contention that a person has the “right to
decide whether to have an abortion without ‘interference from the
State,’” and rejected a strict scrutiny standard of review as “incompatible
with the recognition that there is a substantial state interest in potential
life throughout pregnancy. The very notion that the State has a
substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all
regulations must be deemed unwarranted.” We held it was inappropriate
for the Judicial Branch to provide an exhaustive list of state interests
implicated by abortion.
Casey is premised on the States having an important constitutional
role in defining their interests in the abortion debate. It is only with this
principle in mind that Nebraska’s interests can be given proper weight.
The State’s brief describes its interests as including concern for the life
of the unborn and “for the partially-born,” in preserving the integrity of
the medical profession, and in “erecting a barrier to infanticide.” A
review of Casey demonstrates the legitimacy of these policies. The Court
141
should say so.
In his Stenberg dissent, Justice Kennedy recognized the important role state
142
legislatures play in mediating societal divisions over abortion. He argued that
the Court should not foreclose state “political processes” from regulating “to
promote the life of the unborn and to ensure respect for all human life and its
143
potential.” State legislative deliberations represent “a vital means for citizens to
address these grave and serious issues,” a necessary step for progress “in the
144
attainment of some degree of consensus.”
140. See id. at 960–61.
141. Id. at 960–61 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 968–70 (noting that “legislators have been afforded the widest latitude” in situations where
there is “disagreement[] among medical professionals”).
143. Id. at 957.
144. Id.
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In discussing the state interests furthered by the Nebraska statute, Justice
Kennedy affirmed that “[s]tates may take sides in the abortion debate and come
145
down on the side of life, even life in the unborn.” In addition, however, he
focused on a number of state concerns that seem distinct from the bare interest in
146
protecting “potential life” that the Court permitted states to pursue in Roe. For
instance, he argued that “[s]tates also have an interest in forbidding medical
procedures which, in the State’s reasonable determination, might cause the
medical profession or society as a whole to become insensitive, even disdainful,
147
to life, including life in the human fetus.” Here, the concern was not the moral
question of the value of fetal life per se, but rather a sociological concern about
the effects of a disturbing method of late-term abortion on public and medical
148
attitudes regarding human life. Similarly, he thought the Nebraska statute
furthered a state interest in protecting the reputation of the medical profession:
“A State may take measures to ensure the medical profession and its members
are viewed as healers, sustained by a compassionate and rigorous ethic and
cognizant of the dignity and value of human life, even life which cannot survive
149
without the assistance of others.” Justice Kennedy also focused on the partial
delivery of the fetus in the course of a D&X abortion, which made the procedure
more akin to infanticide than the D&E procedure:
Nebraska was entitled to find the existence of a consequential moral
difference between the procedures. We are referred to substantial
medical authority that D&X perverts the natural birth process to a greater
degree than D&E, commandeering the live birth process until the skull is
pierced. . . . The D&X differs from the D&E because in the D&X the
fetus is “killed outside of the womb” where the fetus has “an autonomy
which separates it from the right of the woman to choose treatments for
her own body.” Witnesses to the procedure relate that the fingers and feet
of the fetus are moving prior to the piercing of the skull; when the
scissors are inserted in the back of the head, the fetus’ body, wholly
outside the woman’s body and alive, reacts as though startled and goes
limp. D&X’s stronger resemblance to infanticide means Nebraska could
conclude the procedure presents a greater risk of disrespect for life and a

145. Id. at 961.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 147–50 (discussing the states’ sociological interests and interest
in protecting the medical profession).
147. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
148. See id.
149. Id. at 962.
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consequent greater risk to the profession and society, which depend for
150
their sustenance upon reciprocal recognition of dignity and respect.
This resemblance between the D&X abortion and infanticide underlies Justice
Kennedy’s response to two of the concurring Justices, who argued that D&X and
D&E methods of abortion are both gruesome, making it irrational to ban one and
151
permit the other.
D. Gonzales v. Carhart
After the Court invalidated Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion statute in
152
Stenberg, Congress passed federal legislation prohibiting the procedure. The
Supreme Court upheld this federal law in Gonzales v. Carhart, with Justice
153
Kennedy writing the 5–4 majority opinion. Justice Kennedy’s opinion found
the federal statute more specific in describing the D&X procedure (this time
labeled an “intact dilation and evacuation,” or an intact D&E) than the Nebraska
statute in Stenberg, eliminating the concern that the statute might also be read to
154
forbid standard D&E abortions. The majority also accepted the congressional
judgment that a maternal-health exception was not needed because the intact
155
D&E is never necessary to preserve maternal health.
The Gonzales opinion applied the standards from the Casey plurality,
including its dicta on viability, even though not all of the Justices in the majority
156
had agreed with Casey. Gonzales introduced Casey’s standards with the
statement “[w]e assume the following principles for the purposes of this
157
opinion,” as if the majority was saving for another day the question of whether
the Casey plurality opinion should continue to control. Justice Kennedy’s opinion
158
later referenced “the principles accepted as controlling here,” reinforcing the
impression that the majority might not be fully committed to Casey as a final
statement of the Court’s position on abortion rights.
Justice Kennedy noted the federal ban on partial-birth abortion applied “both
previability and postviability because, by common understanding and scientific
terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the womb, whether or not

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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Id. at 962–63 (emphasis in original).
Id. (Justice Kennedy responding to Justices Stevens and Ginsburg).
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Id. at 150–56.
Id. at 161–67.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 156.
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159

it is viable outside the womb.” Despite the statute’s application prior to fetal
viability, Gonzales upheld the legislation on the theory that it did not place any
160
undue burden on previability abortions.
As in his Stenberg dissent, Justice Kennedy’s Gonzales opinion focused on
governmental interests furthered by the federal statute, some of which seemed to
161
go beyond Roe’s bare interest in protecting “potential life.” The majority
credited a congressional finding that allowing partial-birth abortion would
“further coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable
162
and innocent human life,” just as Justice Kennedy in Stenberg had accepted
Nebraska’s argument that the procedure could cause “society as a whole to
163
become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life in the human fetus.”
Gonzales also found a legitimate “interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of
164
the medical profession,” an interest similarly highlighted in the Stenberg
165
dissent.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Gonzales likewise echoed his Stenberg dissent
in affirming a federal interest in drawing a line between abortion and
166
infanticide. The legitimacy of such an interest is perhaps suggested by the
recent publication in the Journal of Medical Ethics of an article in which the
authors argue that “what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should
be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the
167
newborn is not disabled.” The authors “propose to call this practice ‘after-birth
abortion’, rather than ‘infanticide’, to emphasise [sic] that the moral status of the
individual killed is comparable with that of a fetus (on which ‘abortions’ in the
168
traditional sense are performed) rather than to that of a child.” Justice
Kennedy’s Gonzales opinion found the federal ban on partial-birth abortion
169
justified in part by an interest in countering such arguments. He quoted with
approval the congressional findings that partial birth abortion “had a ‘disturbing

159. Id. at 147.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 157; see also supra text accompanying notes 147–50 (discussing in Stenberg the states’
sociological interests and interest in protecting the medical profession).
162. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (quoting congressional finding that “[i]mplicitly approving such a brutal
and inhumane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further coarsen society to the humanity of not only
newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life”).
163. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 961 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
164. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997)).
165. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158.
167. Alberto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva, After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?, J. MED.
ETHICS 1 (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2012/03/01/medethics-2011-100411
.full.pdf+html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
168. Id. at 2.
169. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158.
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similarity to the killing of a newborn infant,’” and that Congress “was concerned
with ‘draw[ing] a bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and
170
infanticide.’” Significantly, this justification for the federal statute only works
as to previability abortions if one sees a strong kinship between the previable
fetus and a newborn infant, such that killing the former after partial delivery
would be confusingly similar to killing the latter after birth.
E. Justice Kennedy and the Future of the Viability Rule
The extent to which states may regulate second-trimester abortions depends
in significant part on the Supreme Court’s future treatment of the viability rule.
In Webster, Justice Kennedy joined an opinion that criticized the viability rule,
while dicta in Casey purported to reaffirm the rule, albeit in a significantly less171
potent form than the version embraced in Roe. Justice Kennedy’s opinions in
Stenberg and Gonzales recognized substantial justifications for state regulation of
172
late-term abortions, even before fetal viability. Going forward, a significant
question will be the Court’s willingness to revisit the role of viability in abortion
law as states enact second-trimester regulations.
In a future case involving late-term abortions, Justice Kennedy could read his
Stenberg and Gonzales opinions in a manner consistent with the treatment of
viability in the Casey plurality. Justice Kennedy carefully drafted both opinions
on the assumption that Casey—including its dicta on viability—embodied the
173
controlling constitutional standards. At the same time, there is much in Justice
Kennedy’s Stenberg and Gonzales opinions that creates tension with the viability
rule, and makes it more difficult to justify that rule in constitutional terms.
Therefore, I will discuss at least two paths Justice Kennedy might take if he finds
the viability rule incompatible with legitimate state interests supporting
regulation of late-term abortions.
1. New State Interests and the Duration of Abortion Rights
One theme of Justice Kennedy’s Stenberg dissent was that, in justifying
abortion regulations, states should not be limited to the two narrow state interests
174
identified by the Roe Court. He understood Casey to stand for the proposition

170. Id. (citations omitted).
171. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 517 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
172. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157–
58.
173. See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146 (“Casey, in short, struck a balance. The balance was central to
its holding. We now apply its standard to the cases at bar.”).
174. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 962 (asserting that the state has an interest in protecting the reputation

54

02_BECK_VER_01_5-21-12_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

7/22/2013 2:32 PM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
that it is “inappropriate for the Judicial Branch to provide an exhaustive list of
175
state interests implicated by abortion.” This broadened view of permissible
state interests justifying abortion regulations appeared to underlay the majority
176
177
opinion in Gonzales. The federal statute was not upheld solely on the basis of
178
Roe’s concern for the “potential life” of the unborn fetus. Rather, the Court saw
the statute as furthering a multiplicity of state interests distinct from the interest
179
in protecting the life of any particular fetus. The statute was thought to preserve
respect for human life among the public and the medical profession, protect the
ethics and reputation of medical personnel, and clarify the distinction between
180
abortion and infanticide.
Notwithstanding the majority’s recognition of these new state interests
justifying regulation of abortion, the Gonzales opinion “assumed” that the
181
viability rule would remain the measure of the duration of abortion rights.
However, there is no particular reason this should be the case, and many reasons
to believe it should not. Roe’s dicta on the duration of abortion rights took the
position that the point at which a particular state interest would justify substantial
182
restrictions on abortion depended on the particular state interest in question.
Thus, an interest in promoting maternal health justified regulation at the end of
the first trimester, when abortion might present a greater risk to the mother’s
183
health than carrying a child to term. The interest in protecting fetal life justified
184
185
regulation only at viability, though for reasons the Court did not articulate.
Just as the states could assert the distinct interests recognized in Roe at different
points in pregnancy, now that Gonzales permits states to advance previously
186
unrecognized interests in support of abortion regulations, there is no reason all
of those interests should be subject to the same durational line.
Consider, for example, the state laws passed in a number of jurisdictions
forbidding most abortions after twenty weeks of pregnancy on the theory that the
187
fetus can feel pain at that stage of development. Assuming the Court finds
medical professionals as “healers”).
175. Id. 960–61.
176. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156–60.
177. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
178. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156–60.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 157–58; see also supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text.
181. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146 (“We assume the following principles for the purposes of this
opinion.”).
182. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
183. See id. at 163.
184. Id.
185. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
186. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156–60.
187. Erik Erikholm, Several States Forbid Abortion After 20 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at A10.
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prevention of fetal pain to be a legitimate state interest, there seems to be no
reason why viability would prove particularly relevant to the permissibility of
state laws premised on that interest. There does not appear to be any logical
connection between the ability of the fetus to feel pain, which depends more on
188
neurological development, and the ability of the fetus to live outside the womb,
189
which depends more on the development of respiratory capacity. The Court
could appropriately confine the viability rule to the state interest the Court
designed the rule to cover, a purely moral assessment of the value of unborn
human life, and recognize different durational limits for the new state interests
now permitted under Gonzales.
2. Stare Decisis and the Duration of Abortion Rights
Should a case concerning state regulation of previability, late-term abortions
come before the Court, another path open to the Justices would be
reconsideration of the viability rule. In an article on the rule of stare decisis, I
190
argue that the viability rule does not merit treatment as binding precedent. The
article highlights three factors that have led the Court to deny or accord
diminished precedential weight to rules articulated in prior opinions. First, the
viability rule constituted dictum when announced in Roe and when reaffirmed in
191
the Casey plurality opinion.
Both Roe and Casey concerned abortion
regulations applicable from the outset of pregnancy, so neither case required the
Court to determine the duration of abortion rights in order to resolve the
192
constitutional issues presented. Second, the Court has been more willing to
193
reconsider rules announced without plenary briefing and argument. Since the
duration of abortion rights was not at issue in Roe or Casey, the briefing and
argument in those cases did not focus on the merits of viability as compared to
194
other possible lines governing the duration of abortion rights. Nor did the Court
Evidence suggesting that the risk of medical complications from abortion increases as gestational age advances
may provide additional support for such statutes. See, e.g., Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors for Legal
Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the United States, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 735 (2004)
(“The risk factor that continues to be most strongly associated with mortality from legal abortion is gestational
age at the time of the abortion.”); id. at 733 (table showing significant increase in risk of mortality when
abortion performed at twenty-one weeks or beyond).
188. See Emily Sohn, Do Fetuses Feel Pain?, DISCOVERY NEWS (Apr. 26, 2010), http://news.
discovery.com/human/fetus-pain-abortion-law.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
189. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (hypothesizing about the
possible effect on the point of viability of future enhancement of “fetal respiratory capacity”).
190. See Beck, Transtemporal Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1460–64.
191. Id. at 1460–63.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 1434–39 (illustrating that the Court has afforded less precedential weight to rules not
adequately briefed or argued).
194. See id. at 1462–63.
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consider the possibility of dispensing with a one-size-fits-all line drawn by the
judiciary. Perhaps instead of the Court drawing a single line to govern abortion
rights nationwide, the Court should permit states to experiment with different
regulatory regimes, and legislative lines, along with other factors, should be
considered in deciding whether a particular state has unduly burdened abortion
rights. Third, the Court has been more willing to revisit rulings that have not been
195
adequately defended in a written opinion. Roe offered no defense of the
viability rule, while the brief defense provided in Casey raises unanswered
questions and has arguably been undermined by the subsequent opinion in
196
Gonzales.
Several of the “prudential and pragmatic considerations” that the Casey
plurality saw as favoring retention of Roe’s right to an abortion instead support
197
reconsideration of the viability rule. For instance, Casey concluded that Roe has
198
not proven “unworkable.” Even if we accept this conclusion with respect to the
basic constitutional right to an abortion, one can make a much stronger argument
that viability constitutes an unworkable line if the goal is to enforce state
regulations of late-term abortions. Recall the Colautti Court’s emphasis on “the
uncertainty of the viability determination,” “the number and the imprecision of
[the relevant] variables,” the “difficulty” of determining whether a particular
fetus is viable, the different probabilities of survival doctors equate with viability,
and the likelihood “that experts will disagree over whether a particular fetus in
199
the second trimester has advanced to the stage of viability.” Strikingly, research
shows that the doctor’s prediction concerning viability is itself a factor
significantly affecting the survival prospects of extremely low birth-weight
200
infants. The imprecision of the viability line will make it very difficult in some
cases to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular doctor knew he or she
was aborting a viable fetus. In his Stenberg dissent, Justice Kennedy criticized
“cases decided in the wake of Roe . . . which gave a physician’s treatment
201
decisions controlling weight.” The viability rule seems subject to the same
critique, deferring to the physician’s judgment to such a degree that it
undermines the goal of regulating the physician’s conduct.

195. Id. at 1439–47.
196. See Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 267–79 (discussing the holes in
the analytical framework of Roe and Casey and the status of the viability rule in light of Gonzales).
197. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
198. Id. at 855.
199. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395–96 (1979).
200. See Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 260 (quoting Jay D. Iams,
Preterm Birth, in STEVEN G. GABBE ET AL., OBSTETRICS: NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 755, 812 (4th
ed. 2002)).
201. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 968 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Another factor the Casey plurality considered was reliance on the right to
202
abortion. The plurality recognized that Roe had not engendered the sort of
203
investment-based reliance one might find in the commercial sphere. But the
plurality believed individuals had “organized intimate relationships and made
choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society” based
on the assumption that abortion would be an available option “in the event that
204
contraception should fail.” Even assuming this is the case, it is much less
plausible that anyone has made such personal or professional decisions in
reliance on the viability rule. The ability to terminate an unintended pregnancy
might influence decisions about relationships or career choices, but it is much
less likely that such decisions would turn on whether the right to abortion
continues through the second trimester.
In reaffirming Roe’s right to an abortion, the Casey plurality concluded that
“[n]o evolution of legal principle has left Roe’s doctrinal footings weaker than
205
they were in 1973.” It would be hard to say the same about the viability rule.
Starting with Webster, the Court’s decisions (including Casey itself) have greatly
diminished the significance of fetal viability in evaluating state abortion
206
regulations. Webster seemingly departed from earlier decisions interpreting the
viability rule when it permitted Missouri to create a rebuttable presumption of
viability at twenty weeks of pregnancy and to guide the physician’s discretion in
207
considering factors relevant to viability. Though Casey purported to reaffirm
the viability rule, it simultaneously deprived the rule of its earlier force,
concluding that Roe had significantly undervalued the state interest in unborn
208
human life by preventing previability regulation. Gonzales cast further doubt
209
on the premises underlying the viability rule. Gonzales permitted a ban on the
intact D&E procedure prior to fetal viability, leading Justice Ginsburg to charge
that the majority had “blur[red] the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between
210
previability and postviability abortions.” The Gonzales Court permitted the
previability ban based in part on a state interest in distinguishing abortion and
211
infanticide. This argument implicitly analogizes the previable fetus to a
newborn infant and undermines the assumption that some significant change
makes the fetus more valuable or worthy of protection once it crosses the

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
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Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56.
Id.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 857.
See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
See id.; supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Id. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See supra Part III.D.
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viability threshold. In light of Gonzales, it is not clear why the state should have
a sufficient interest in the life of a previable fetus to protect it from death by one
means, but not to protect it from death by other means that may be “no less
212
distressing or susceptible to gruesome description.”
The fourth factor the Casey plurality considered concerned whether any
213
factual assumptions underlying the Roe decision had been undermined. Here,
the plurality acknowledged that viability occurred at an earlier point in pregnancy
than at the time of Roe, but decided that this was not critical to the validity of the
viability rule:
[T]he divergences from the factual premises of 1973 have no bearing on
the validity of Roe’s central holding, that viability marks the earliest
point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate
to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions. The soundness or
unsoundness of that constitutional judgment in no sense turns on whether
viability occurs at approximately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of
Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at some moment
even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as it may if fetal respiratory capacity
can somehow be enhanced in the future. Whenever it may occur, the
attainment of viability may continue to serve as the critical fact, just as it
has done since Roe was decided; which is to say that no change in Roe’s
factual underpinning has left its central holding obsolete, and none
214
supports an argument for overruling it.
This discussion highlights why the Casey plurality might have done well to
wait for a case involving late-term abortions before trying to determine the
215
duration of abortion rights. Since the durational issue was not important to a
ruling on the validity of the Pennsylvania provisions at issue in Casey, the record
had not been prepared with late-term abortions prominently in view, obscuring
216
the consequences of a decision reaffirming the viability rule. In a case where
the continuing potency of the viability rule was important to the outcome, the
record and briefing might have focused the Court on a great number of facts
about viability and late-term abortion methods that were simply not highlighted
for the Court at the time of Roe or Casey. In neither Roe nor Casey, for instance,
did the Court exhibit awareness of the racial and gender disparities characterizing
fetal viability and the consequent disparities in the duration of abortion rights

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 951 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
Id.
See id.
See id.
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217

under the Court’s opinions. Neither case mentioned the role played by
218
irrelevant behavioral and environmental factors. Neither reflected awareness of
219
the distressing procedures currently used in second-trimester abortions.
The viability rule presents a classic example of the Court applying a rule
220
concerning an issue the Court has never “squarely addressed.” The Court
adopted the viability rule in dicta in Roe and reaffirmed the rule in dicta in
221
Casey. The Court has never considered the merits of the viability rule based on
plenary briefing and argument in a case where it mattered to the outcome.
Consequently, the Court has never been required to grapple with the rationale for
the viability rule, the strange consequences it produces for constitutional law, or
the extreme implications it carries for late-term abortions. Given the Court’s
222
acknowledged obligation to “justify the lines we draw,” it is time for such an
223
examination to occur, and the rule of stare decisis should present no barrier to
the Court’s fulfillment of that obligation.
IV. CONCLUSION
No Justice currently on the Supreme Court has had as great an impact on the
constitutional law of abortion as Justice Kennedy. His views may play a central
role in evaluating the constitutional validity of state laws regulating late-term
abortions. His opinions leave room for multiple outcomes should the Court
squarely face a case calling into question the continuing vitality of the viability
rule.

217. See id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
218. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
219. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe, 410 U.S. 113. Indeed, at the time of Roe, the methods of abortion at
issue in cases like Stenberg and Gonzales were not yet in common use. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75–79 (1976). Three years after Roe, the Court reported that the most common method
used for second trimester abortions was saline amniocentesis. See id.
220. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 118 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984);
Beck, Transtemporal Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 1464.
221. Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
222. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
223. Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the Viability Rule, supra note 23, at 279–80.
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